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Abstract 
How well does the theory of the firm explain the choice between intrafirm and arms' length 
trade? This paper uses firm-level import data from France to look into this question. We find 
support  for  three  key  predictions  of  property-rights  theories  of  the  multinational  firm. 
Intrafirm  imports  are  more  likely:  (i)  in  capital-  and  skill-intensive  firms;  (ii)  in  highly 
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bridge previous aggregate findings with our investigation by decomposing intrafirm imports 
into an extensive and intensive margin. Doing so we uncover interesting patterns in the data 
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Multinational companies (MNCs) are central in international trade. Intrarm imports alone ac-
count for over 40% of US total imports (Zeile, 2003, Bernard et al. 2010). MNCs have therefore
become central in public debate too, not least in OECD countries where concerns about the re-
location of production facilities to low-wage emerging economies are widespread. Naturally, the
pattern of cross-border production networks and FDI 
ows has also attracted much attention
among economists. In particular, substantial research eorts aim to explain why some interna-
tional transactions are carried out within a rm or at arms' length on markets.
Understanding the very existence of MNCs requires a theory of why foreign operations are
kept internal rather than licensed to local rms (the \internalization" question in Dunning, 1981).
A well-established literature emphasizes intangible assets such as knowledge and reputation.1 In
these theories MNCs exploit the public good nature of intangible assets in multi-plant operations,
which gives them an edge over single-plant local rivals. Internalization is driven by the risk of
third parties dissipating the value of these assets, given the legal environment.
More recent contributions have taken on an explicit contract-theoretical approach of multina-
tionals.2 These theories provide foundations for the existence of cross-border contractual frictions,
which in turn drive organizational choice. Some of them also explain how these frictions combine
with other country characteristics, such as factor abundance, to aect comparative advantage and
trade patterns.
This rapidly expanding theoretical literature has triggered a series of empirical investigations
on US intrarm trade (Antr as 2003, Yeaple 2006, Nunn and Tre
er 2008, Bernard et al. 2010,
Costinot et al. 2010). Most of these studies nd support for the property-rights approach taken
by Antr as (2003) and Antr as and Helpman (2004; 2008). However, while useful and important
rst steps, these analyses are conned to the industry- or imported product-level.
This paper exploits rm-level data on imports of manufactured goods by French rms in
1999 to oer a deeper look at international sourcing modes. Breaking down imports by rm,
origin country and product category we look into the predictions of property-rights models of
multinationals' organizational choices. Our data allows us to go beyond aggregate intrarm trade
shares and distinguish between the likelihood of a rm-country-product triple to belong to one
1Prime examples are Ethier (1986), Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and Ethier and Markusen (1996). Good
surveys of this literature are available in Markusen (1995) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
2See among others McLaren (2000), Antr as (2003), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), Antr as and
Helpman (2004; 2008), Marin and Verdier (2003, 2008) and Costinot et al. (2010). Good surveys of the literature
are found in Helpman (2006), Spencer (2007) and Antr as and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Some of the most illustrative
recent work along this line of research is published in Helpman, Marin and Verdier (2008).
2of the two sourcing modes (\extensive margin") and the average value of imports in that mode
(\intensive margin").
Two new lessons can be drawn from our analysis.
i) First, key results of property-rights theory nd empirical support at the rm level. In
particular, we nd that the choice of intrarm sourcing is more likely in capital- and skill-intensive
rms. More productive rms are also more likely to engage in intrarm trade, typically importing
higher amounts. These results match the predictions of Antr as (2003) and Antr as and Helpman
(2004; 2008). In addition, we nd that imports from countries with well-functioning judicial
institutions are more likely to be intrarm. The latter result can be explained by property-rights
models. Transaction-costs models would predict the opposite, as stronger contract enforcement
mostly reduces the costs of outsourcing.
ii) Second, our analysis shows two important limits of an industry- or product-level approach.
On the one hand, we nd a rm's factor intensity to be an important determinant of sourcing
decisions, but one that varies substantially within narrowly dened sectors. This suggests that
the property-rights model can be protably extended to allow for rm-specic technologies. On
the other hand, we nd that some previous results on aggregate intrarm import shares are
driven by import values (intensive margin) rather than individual sourcing choices. For instance,
country intrarm import shares increase with capital abundance, as in previous studies, but the
likelihood to engage in intrarm trade decreases with capital abundance. The former result is
driven by the intensive margin: import volumes under outsourcing tend to decrease with capital
abundance. Overall, our results suggest that future theoretical research should look more deeply
into determinants of both the extensive and intensive margins of intrarm trade.
In addition to the above-cited papers, our framework is related to the large empirical literature
on rm boundaries within countries.3 One can think of two useful ways in which the research
program on the boundaries of multinationals complements its domestic counterpart. It exploits
more systematically collected data on the nature of transactions and does not overwhelmingly
focus on the transaction-cost approach (although a recent exception is Acemoglu et al. 2010).
Our paper is also related to studies of internalization in multinationals that focus on narrower
samples or narrower aspects of sourcing choices. Using a subset of our French data Defever
and Toubal (2007) nd a positive relationship between rm TFP and the outsourcing choice
among MNCs which report higher xed costs of outsourcing, and the opposite among MNCs
that report higher costs of internalization. Their nding complements the self-selection based
on TFP result we point to in our paper. Using the same data Carluccio and Fally (2009) nd
3See for instance the survey by Lafontaine and Slade (2007).
3that complex inputs are more likely to be imported intrarm from countries with a low level of
nancial development. We complement that result by providing evidence that complex goods and
inputs are more likely to be produced within rm boundaries. Finally Kohler and Smolka (2009),
using cross-sectional Spanish data, nd that more productive rms are more likely to engage in
intrarm rather than arms' length, and foreign rather than domestic sourcing. However, they do
not explore other determinants of the sourcing choice nor investigate the dierence between the
extensive and intensive margin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we state four testable predictions
of property-rights models and explain their intuition. In Section 3 we describe the construction
of our estimation sample and give a general overview of the key variables in our analysis, which
are described in more detail in the Appendix. In Section 4, we present and discuss our econo-
metric tests of the four predictions. In Section 5 we replicate existing product- and industry-level
evidence, and show the importance of examining both the intensive and the extensive margins of
international sourcing. Section 6 concludes and suggests avenues for future research.
2 Theoretical Background
Our empirical analysis is motivated by the theoretical predictions of three models: Antr as (2003),
Antr as and Helpman (2004; 2008). These three models jointly predict which rms are more likely
to resort to intrarm trade, and which countries are more likely to be involved.
In particular, we are interested in the following predictions:
1. capital- and skill-intensive rms are more likely to engage in intrarm trade
2. more productive rms are more likely to engage in intrarm trade
3. intrarm imports are more likely to originate from capital-abundant countries
4. more productive rms are more likely to import intrarm from countries with good contract
enforcement, although it may not be the case for the average importing rm
In what follows we describe the intuition for these predictions.
Antr as (2003) and Antr as and Helpman (2004; 2008) all build on a common partial equilibrium
framework, inspired by the property-rights approach to the rm (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart
and Moore, 1990). Consider a supplier and a buyer (nal producer) whose assets and investments
are relationship-specic. Due to the incompleteness of contracts, each party risks being held up
4by the other after production, leading to a new division of surplus. No matter what transfers
were agreed ex ante, each party's marginal benet of investment will be restricted by the share of
surplus secured in the ex post renegotiation. Anticipating this, both parties under-invest ex ante.
One way to secure greater bargaining power ex post is to own the productive assets. Property
rights act as residual rights of control, by giving their owner the right to exclude the other party
from production. That possibility raises the owner's outside option when bargaining over surplus
ex post. Expecting a greater share of ex post surplus, the owner has greater incentives to invest
ex ante, which alleviates the under-investment problem. Therefore giving ownership rights to
the party responsible for the main investment (the nal producer in the case of intrarm and
the supplier in the case of outsourcing) maximizes joint surplus. That will eectively be the
organizational form chosen by both parties if ex post bargaining is ecient and utility is costlessly
transferrable ex ante.
This property-rights result can be applied to the analysis of intrarm trade thanks to two
additional assumptions. First, capital investments and skill-intensive headquarter services (general
management and coordination tasks) are provided by the nal producer due to legal or technical
reasons.4 Therefore in capital- and skill-intensive production processes the headquarter rm needs
to be incentivized, and vertical integration is optimal (Prediction 1). Second, intrarm imports
entail higher initial xed costs than arms' length imports. For example aliate setup costs are
plausibly higher than supplier search costs. Therefore Antr as and Helpman (2004) predict that
all else equal a more productive rm is more likely to engage in intrarm trade (Prediction 2).
In labor-intensive sectors, where by Prediction 1 variable costs are already such that outsourcing
is preferred, TFP heterogeneity has no bearing on organizational choice. By contrast, in other
sectors the most productive rms self-select into intrarm trade: only rms suciently productive
to leverage variable costs dierences on large sales and cover the higher xed costs of intrarm
will choose this sourcing mode.
Antr as (2003) embeds a simpler version of that setup in a general equilibrium model of inter-
national trade with imperfect competition as in Helpman and Krugman (1985). There are two
factors, labor and capital, and two sectors with identical rms. By Prediction 1 above, integration
is pervasive in the capital-intensive sector, while outsourcing is pervasive in the labor-intensive
sector. Intrarm imports are the same thing as capital-intensive imports, whose pattern is gov-
erned by comparative advantage. Assuming free entry, identical and homothetic preferences, and
4Antr as (2003) mentions evidence of higher cost-sharing in capital investments than in labor investments among
US multinationals, even in their aliates. This may come from credit market imperfections, or from the fact that
labor investment decisions require local knowledge, but is in any case beyond the scope of the model. That the
supplier does not provide any capital investment or headquarter services can be thought of as a limit case.
5that immobile endowments are in the Factor Price Equalization set, Antr as (2003) shows that
the share of intrarm imports increases in the origin country's capital/labor ratio (Prediction 3).
This is a pure composition eect: more varieties of capital-intensive inputs than labor-intensive
inputs are imported from capital-abundant countries. Importantly, factor abundance should have
no eect on the likelihood of intrarm trade within a given industry.5
Antr as and Helpman (2008) extend their 2004 model to allow for partially contractible pro-
duction tasks. Both headquarter services and component production require contractible and
non-contractible tasks, to an extent that depends on the local contracting environment. Sup-
pose more component production tasks become contractible, ie `input contractibility' increases.
This does not change anything in labor-intensive partnerships, which by Prediction 1 were fully
outsourcing their input production. But in other sectors a ceteris paribus improvement in input
contractibility has two eects: rst, the most productive domestic producers switch to oshore
outsourcing; second, the most productive rms resorting to oshore outsourcing start insourcing
from foreign aliates (Prediction 4).6 The second eect derives from a lower need to incentivize
component producers after the input contractibility improvement. In sum, improved contract
enforcement in the origin country favors international sourcing, but does not clearly favor one
sourcing mode. Which eect dominates is an empirical question, which requires data on the
contractibility of tasks performed by each party.
3 Data
The population of interest consists of importing rms, since the above theoretical predictions
apply to them and not to rms sourcing only domestically. We use data on the two sourcing
modes { either arms' length or intrarm { of French imports in 1999. The observation unit is a
rm-country-product triple: rm i sourcing product p from country c either at arms' length or
intrarm. In what follows we describe the construction of the sample and the variables used in
the analysis.
3.1 Primary Data Sources
We rely on three primary data sources. First, the EIIG ( Echanges Internationaux Intra-Groupe)
database documents the sourcing mode in a rm's yearly imports by origin country and by CPA96
5More precisely, this statement applies to the baseline version of the Antr as (2003) model. In a working paper
version the author suggests an extension to a CES production function where that prediction is altered. We discuss
that possibility in Section 4.3.
6Nunn and Tre
er term these two eects the Standard and Surprise Eect, respectively.
6or HS4 4-digit product codes in 1999. Intrarm trade is dened as trade with an aliate controlled
by a single French entity with at least fty percent of its equity capital. The data covers 4,305 rms
and comes from a survey conducted in 1999 by the French Ministry of Industry's SESSI (Service
des  Etudes Statistiques Industrielles). The survey was addressed to all rms incorporated in
France and trading more than 1 million euros, owned by manufacturing groups that control at
least fty percent of the equity capital of an aliate based outside France. We refer to this group of
rms (8,236 units) as the 'EIIG target population'.7 The response rate was 52.27%, but the 4,305
respondent rms represent more than 80% of total exports and imports of French multinationals.
Non-respondent rms are excluded from our analysis because information on the sourcing mode is
not available. We discuss and address sample selection issues in the Appendix. These data have
been previously used by Defever and Toubal (2007) and Carluccio and Fally (2009), who do not
deal with sample selection.
Although some rms in the EIIG dataset source part of their imports at arms' length, by
construction they all have an aliate so that limiting ourselves to these rms would bias our
results towards intrarm trade. For instance SESSI estimates that around 36% of the total value
of manufacturing imports is intrarm (Guannel and Plateau, 2003), while in the EIIG data the
corresponding value is much higher (55.4%). We must thus complement the EIIG with import
data on non-multinational rms.
To this end we use a second database, coming from the French Customs Oce, documenting
the universe of import and export 
ows in 1999 at the rm, origin country and product level.
These data were used (among others) by Eaton et al. (2004). The data are collected from custom
declarations.8. The total value of imports in the database represents about 99% of French aggre-
gate imports in 1999 as reported by EUROSTAT, with the 1% dierence being due to the imputed
trade of rms not obliged to report information to the French Customs Oce. Regrettably, this
dataset does not provide information on whether imports come from a related party (unlike US
customs data for example).
Finally, the EAE (Enqu^ ete Annuelle Entreprise) database provides balance sheet data on
manufacturing rms. The data come from a census of all French rms with at least 20 employees
whose primary activity is in the manufacturing sector (NACE rev1 D category), conducted by the
French Ministry of Industry's SESSI and the Ministry of Agriculture's SCEES (Service Central
des Enqu^ etes et des  Etudes Statistiques). Firms in the EAE database represent 9.8% of the
7We thank Boris Guannel from SESSI for providing us with the complete list of rms belonging to the target
population.
8For trade outside the EU15, there is no minimal amount for data to be recorded. Within the EU, only trade
whose total annual amount exceeds 250,000 euros should be registered. Even then many trade 
ows below this
threshold are still registered.
7total number of French manufacturing rms, but 87.2% of production in 1999 as reported by
EUROSTAT.
By merging information coming from Customs data with the EIIG data on respondent rms
we get our baseline estimation sample. In our analysis we will refer to this sample as the `large
sample'. It includes 281,419 rm-country-product triples spanning over 14,711 rms, 219 countries
and 272 CPA96 4-digit products. Matching the large sample with the EAE data generates what
we refer to as the 'small sample': 98,168 triples spanning over 5,175 rms, 185 countries and 270
products. More details on the construction of the two samples are provided in the Appendix.
3.2 Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
In most of the analysis our dependent variable is yi;p;c: a binary variable that takes value one if a
French rm i imports product p from country c (mostly) from a foreign aliate in 1999, and zero
otherwise.
We use a binary variable for several reasons. First, only a few product-country-rm triples
involve both intrarm and arms' length imports, so that intrarm trade shares cluster around zero
and one. Furthermore, we actually keep record of most of this `mixed transactions' information
by recording as intrarm or outsourcing a rm-country-product triple for which at least 80% of
the total value occurs in one of the two sourcing modes.9 Second, we are mainly interested in the
determinants of the sourcing mode and in the theories we consider a given rm-product-country
triple should correspond to a unique choice. Finally, intrarm trade values may be distorted in
systematic ways for reasons unrelated to these models (such as taxation or accounting purposes).
That said, in Section 5 we look simultaneously at the extensive (sourcing mode) and the intensive
(import value for a given sourcing mode) margins.
Our key covariates can be divided into three groups: (i) importing rm total factor productiv-
ity (TFPi), capital intensity (ki), and skill intensity (hi); (ii) sourcing country capital abundance
(kc), skill abundance (hc), and quality of the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts (Qc);
(iii) imported product contractibility (p), embodied capital intensity (kp), embodied skill inten-
sity (hp), and (main) nal product contractibility (f). Our set of controls includes corporate
tax rates, a measure of nancial development, distance, OECD membership, past colonial ties,
common language, and common legal origin. Additional information about data sources and the
construction of variables is provided in the Appendix.
9That way we exclude only 1.72% of all observations in the nal sample. See the Appendix for details.
84 Firm-, Country-, and Product-Level Determinants of the In-
trarm vs. Outsourcing Decision
We start by stating two important facts about the data in Section 4.1. We then conduct two sets of
estimations: one focusing on rm-level determinants and the other on country- and product-level
determinants of the intrarm vs. outsourcing decision. The methodology and results of each set
of estimations are presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.
In most of the analysis we estimate a two-stage probit model. In the rst stage, which is esti-
mated on the group of rms belonging to the EIIG target population, we use a probit specication
to model the selection into response to the EIIG survey from which information on intrarm trade
is coming. In the second stage, we combine EIIG and Customs data and model the probability
that imports at the rm-country-product level are intrarm depending on rm-, country-, and
product-level characteristics. We use, again a probit specication with the binary dependent vari-
able yi;p;c taking value one if rm i imports product p from country c intrarm and zero otherwise.
In the second stage, we take into account selection into response to the EIIG survey by means of
the inverse Mills ratio coming from the rst stage (IM1). Raw correlations of yi;p;c with the key
variables used in our analysis are reported in Table I.
In Section 4.2, we use the small sample to estimate the probability that imports at the rm-
country-product level are intrarm depending on rm-level characteristics, while using product
and country dummies to control for unobserved heterogeneity. This approach reduces the risk
of omitted variable bias without imposing further assumptions on the correlation between the
dummies and the rm-level regressors. In addition, as we systematically cluster standard errors
by rm, our estimations allow for correlations in the error structure across countries and products
involved in a given rm sourcing strategy. In Section 4.3, we analyze the probability that imports
at the rm-country-product level are intrarm based on country and product characteristics. This
second set of estimations, makes use of both the large and small sample allowing us to control for
rm-specic heterogeneity in several ways.
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Descriptive statistics provide two interesting insights. First, intrarm import 
ows are fewer
but larger. Second, some previously analyzed industry-level determinants of internalization show
considerable within-industry heterogeneity.
9Intrarm 
ows are larger. In our baseline sample (large sample) only 8.49% of rm-country-
product triples correspond to intrarm imports, but they account for 38.86% of total imports'
value. In the small sample (for which we have balance sheet information) triples corresponding to
intrarm imports account for 13.65% of all triples but represent 42.67% of the value of imports.10
Figure I shows the kernel-smoothed distribution of log imports' value (in euros) by rm-country-
product for both intrarm and outsourcing. As showed by the Figure, the distribution of intrarm
imports values lies to the right of that of outsourcing. The two distributions have somewhat similar
shapes and very close upper bounds of the supports (21.39 for intrarm and 21.82 for outsourcing)
but very dierent lower bounds. Summarizing:
Fact 1: Intrarm imports are rare, but typically involve larger values.
While there are many possible interpretations of Fact 1, it is denitely consistent with Predic-
tion 2. If intrarm sourcing requires higher xed costs, the most productive rms will self-select
into that mode. As they operate on a higher scale intrarm import values will be higher.
Within-industry heterogeneity. Descriptive analysis also suggests high within-sector het-
erogeneity in some previously analyzed industry-level determinants of the organizational choice.
Firm-level data can thus provide a deeper look into the issue and, potentially, lead to dierent
results than studies based on aggregate data. In our analysis, we will indeed encounter examples
of such discrepancies.
First of all, in the large sample intrarm trade and outsourcing coexist in virtually all NACE
rev1 3-digit manufacturing industries (roughly 100 units). Taken literally, the industry models
reviewed in Section 2 do not allow for this possibility.
Second, some key determinants of internalization show considerable heterogeneity within
NACE rev1 3-digit industries. Table II reports summary statistics, as well as correlations, of
our key covariates. In particular, the Table provides standard deviations and decomposes them
into a between- and a within-sector component. Statistics are reported for both all EAE rms (top
panel) and the small sample used in rm-level estimations (bottom panel) and provide the same
message. More specically, in the small sample most of the standard deviation of capital intensity
(80.51%) comes from within-industry dierences across rms. The same applies to skill-intensity
(88.58%). This holds despite the fact that we trimmed observations to exclude outliers in value
added and capital per worker. Within-industry heterogeneity in factor intensity is in fact even
10Among respondents to the EIIG survey, intrarm 
ows represent 31.3% of all triples but 55.4% of the value of
imports. Along with other reasons, this suggests some bias in non-response to the EIIG and further motivates our
systematic treatment of sample selection bias. See the Appendix for more details.
10more pronounced than its TFP counterpart, which is well-documented in the trade literature.
This echoes Bernard et al. (2003) who observe that \industry [...] is a poor indicator of factor
intensity" in data on US manufacturing rms. Summarizing:
Fact 2: Firm characteristics such as capital and skill intensity display much more variance within
than across industries.
One would think it natural to test predictions of theories of the rm with rm-level data,
which is what we do. What Fact 2 suggests is that there is a substantial loss of information by
focusing on the industry dimension with the potential of reaching dierent conclusions.11 Having
said that, we certainly acknowledge that some of the heterogeneity we observe may be due to
measurement error in factor intensity variables.
4.2 Firm-Specic Determinants








i;p;c =  + Xi1 + Dp + Dc + "i;p;c (2)
In the rst-stage equation, which is estimated on the group of rms belonging to the EIIG
target population, Responsei takes value one if rm i has responded to the EIIG survey, Importsi
equals the total value of rm i's imports, while NbProductsi and NbCountriesi measure the
number of product categories and origin countries involved in rm i's imports, respectively. Ds
refers to NACE 3-digit sector dummies. These variables re
ect our presumption that a higher
data collection eort was allocated to large importers and/or certain sectors. Unreported results,
available upon request, indeed show that all variables are highly signicant and have the expected
sign ending up with a Pseudo R2 of 0.2788.
In the second-stage equation yi;p;c takes value 1 if imports of rm i of product p from country
c are intrarm, and 0 otherwise. Dp and Dc stand for product and country dummies. The
11Note that Fact 2 does not necessarily imply that rms use dierent technologies. Firms using the same non-CES
technology, but operating at dierent scales, will exhibit dierences in factor intensities. While we cannot rule this
out, we would then expect that TFP and factor intensities are correlated, since TFP determines scale. However,
Table II revels weak correlations between TFP and factor intensities. Unreported results, available upon request,
further show that a weak correlation pattern emerges also when considering deviations from the industry average.
11vector of key rm determinants, Xi, is composed of productivity (TFPi), capital intensity (ki)
and skill intensity (hi).12 Information needed to construct yi;p;c comes from both the EIIG and
Customs data. For those rms i for which information comes from the EIIG data, we use the
inverse Mills ratio obtained from the rst stage (IM1) to control for selection into response. For
those rms i for which information comes from the Customs data, there is no issue of selection
(i.e. IM1 = 0) as they are a random sample of the population of non-multinational French large
importers matching the response rate of the EIIG survey.13
First-stage variables are excluded from second-stage estimations which are carried out on the
small sample. The number of observations in the estimations is a bit smaller than the small
sample size because some country and/or product dummies perfectly predict the outcome and the
corresponding observations are thus dropped.
Table III reports second-stage estimations using variants of (2). Columns 1 to 4 report marginal
eects of the three rm-level regressors independently and jointly.
All explanatory variables have positive and signicant coecients. Columns 1 to 3 reveal that
all three regressors, taken separately, have signicant coecients (at the 1% level) with a sign
consistent with Prediction 1. Column 4 further shows that they keep their sign and signicance
when considered jointly. In sum:
Result 1: Firms with higher capital and skill intensity are more likely to engage in intrarm trade.
Result 2: Intrarm trade is more likely, the higher is rm total factor productivity.14
Result 1 supports Prediction 1 and the residual property rights literature. It also conrms
prior industry- and product-level US studies while suggesting that residual property rights models
could be extended to allow for heterogeneity in capital and skill intensity.
Result 2 is in line with Prediction 2 and complements empirical ndings by Tomiura (2007) and
Defever and Toubal (2007). In unconditional comparisons Tomiura (2007) shows that Japanese
rms outsourcing abroad are less productive than Japanese multinationals, even when the two
categories are mutually exclusive. However in his data intrarm imports of multinationals are
presumed, not observed. Defever and Toubal (2007) run a regression similar to the second stage
of (2) on the sample of rms responding to the EIIG only. They nd that the sign of the TFP
12Reverse causality would be a concern if the two types of international sourcing (intrarm vs outsourcing) had
a strong dierential impact on rms' characteristics, such as productivity or skill intensity. This is a priori unlikely.
Nonetheless, we have estimated variants of the model with lagged rm variables, and found the same qualitative
pattern. Results are omitted to save space but available upon request.
13See the Appendix for further details.
14In unreported regressions we use both a more conservative measure of productivity (value added per worker)
and an Olley and Pakes (1996) measure of TFP obtaining the same qualitative results.
12coecient switches with the rm's relative magnitude of (xed) outsourcing and integration costs
(as reported by the rm), suggesting self-selection as in Antr as and Helpman (2004). However the
Antr as and Helpman (2004) self-selection nding applies to aliate setup costs, which are already
sunk in a population of existing multinationals (EIIG rms). They are therefore likely to pick up
the eect of recurrent xed costs associated with each mode. An additional concern with that
study is that it does not account for sample selection.15
While Results 1 and 2 strongly support property-rights theories, our data do not allow us to
assess predictions of intangible asset theories of multinational rms. For instance, in Ethier and
Markusen (1996) multinationality is more likely in rms with high knowledge capital relative to
physical capital. Data on R&D and advertising expenditure, that are unavailable to us, would
nicely complement our analysis.
4.3 Country and Product Determinants
In this Section we explore country and product determinants of intrarm trade. As discussed
in Section 2, the Antr as (2003) model predicts that intrarm imports are positively correlated
with origin country human capital abundance hc and capital abundance kc (Prediction 3). But
as explained earlier this is a pure composition eect. Factor abundance should have no impact
on sourcing when controlling for industry factor intensity. Therefore, we expect kc and hc to have
signicantly positive coecients in the absence of rm, industry or product measures of factor
intensity, and insignicant coecients otherwise. In what follows we run both types of regressions,
i.e with and without factor intensity measures at the product level (kp and hp) and at the rm
level (ki and hi).
Section 2 also discusses the in
uence of the quality of judicial institutions Qc, as well as
intermediate and nal product contractibility (p and f). A priori these variables have an
indeterminate average eects on sourcing choices, but with systematic dierences along the rm
productivity dimension. Improved contract enforcement causes the most productive rms to
insource and the least productive rms to outsource (Prediction 4).
In addition to these key covariates we control for other variables which may aect the optimal
sourcing mode. We rst include an OECD dummy (OECDc) and the country's corporate tax rate
(Taxc). Prediction 3 relies on factor price equalization, which is more likely to hold among OECD
15First, all rms in the EIIG survey have foreign aliates by construction. Since each rm has a unique TFP
measure, identication of the TFP coecient does not come from comparing rms that do with rms that do not
engage in intrarm, but rather from the share of intrarm imports within a rm. Also they do not deal with
non-response in that survey. In that sense we nd our sample and our non-response correction more appropriate to
test the Antr as and Helpman (2004) prediction (Prediction 2).
13countries due to similar factor endowments. Corporate tax rates proxy for the benets of prot-
shifting, which may aect sourcing choices. We also control for variables commonly used in gravity
equations, such as the log of distance of country c to France (Distwc), past colonial ties (Colonyc),
common language (Languagec) and common legal origin (Same leg origc) indicators.16 Finally,
since FDI (leading to intrarm trade) can partly substitute for weak nancial markets we also
control for the origin country's level of nancial development (Fin   Devc). This is measured by
the ratio of private credit to GDP, which we borrow from Beck (2002).
Again, we use a two-stage procedure to address selection into response to the EIIG survey.
As earlier we estimate the probability of response to the EIIG survey according to (3) and use
the inverse Mills ratio IM1 as an additional covariate in the second stage. We then consider four








i;p;c =  + Xc 1 + Xp 2 + CCc3 + FCi4 + "i;p;c (4)
where the vectors Xc and Xp denote our key country and product covariates, CCc stands for our
country controls, and FCi indicates rm controls.
The estimation of the dierent specications of (4) re
ects some tradeos in using the data.
In specication one, we estimate a simple probit and exploit all rm-country-product observations
available by using the large sample. In doing so, we do not use rm controls (i.e. FCi = 0) and do
not consider nal product contractibility f which is available only for (essentially) manufacturing
rms.17 In order to shed light on the Antr as (2003) composition eect linking factor abundance
and intrarm trade we estimate specication one both with and without product covariates Xp.
Specications two and three account for unobserved rm heterogeneity by, respectively, random
and xed rm eects. We choose to estimate specication two on the group of manufacturing
rms only, rather than the full large sample, in order to be able to estimate the coecient of
16We do not include GDP per capita for two reasons. First, it is highly correlated with the capital/labor ratio,
the human capital/labor ratio as well as with the quality of institutions. Second, although wages can aect the
sourcing choice (e.g. in Antr as and Helpman, 2004), GDP per capita is at best a poor proxy for labor costs. Wages
and productivity vary across countries and what we would really need is a productivity-de
ated measure of wages
in country c (we leave this exercise for future work).
17Our contractibility measure builds on the Rauch (1999) classication, which is mostly limited to manufacturing,
agriculture and mining goods. We thank S ebastien Roux for providing us with data on the NACE code of the whole
population of French rms.
14f. Specication three allows for rm xed eects by means of a conditional xed eects logit
model. In this case, identication of the coecients of Xc and Xp relies on rms that import
dierent products from several countries under dierent sourcing modes. This reduces drastically
the number of observations actually used by the conditional xed eects logit procedure. Another
drawback is that we cannot identify the impact of the contractibility of the nal good f which
is rm-specic. Finally, specication four is estimated by a probit model on the small sample
for which rm-level information from the EAE database is available. The vector of rm controls
FCi corresponds in this case to the rm characteristics used in the previous Section. In all
specications, a few observations are lost during estimations because of the lack of data for some
countries and/or products.
The ve columns of Table IV report the results of the estimation of the dierent models.18 In
columns 1 and 2 we estimate the probit specication one, respectively, without and with product-
level regressors. In column 3 we estimate the random eects probit model (specication two),
while in column 4 we report results of the conditional xed eects logit model (specication
three). Finally in column 5 we estimate specication four, the probit model with rm controls.
Looking across columns, Table IV reveals a pattern in the sign and signicance of some coef-
cients. We can state two results.
Result 3: Intrarm trade is more likely with capital scarce countries. Result 3 holds in dierent
samples of rms, using dierent estimation techniques, and is robust to considering or not
rm or product measures of capital intensity, as well as controlling for the origin country's
skill abundance (hc), nancial development (Fin   Devc) or an OECD dummy.19
At rst glance Result 3 seems to contradict Prediction 3. According to that prediction kc
should have a positive coecient when we do not control for product or rm capital intensity (as
in column 1), and an insignicant one when we do (columns 2 to 5). Instead, the nding that
intrarm imports are more likely when the origin country is capital rich is remarkably robust.
Does Result 3 invalidate the Antr as (2003) model? Not necessarily. Antr as (2003) mentions
that his prediction relies on a specic production function and factor price equalization. With a
general CES production function and an elasticity of substitution between factors below one (as
often found empirically), he argues that rms should outsource more whenever the wage-rental
ratio is high. That is, if factor prices are not equalized, we should observe more outsourcing from
18To save space we do not report estimates of country controls CCc and rm controls FCi.
19Since Fin Devc is not available for China in 1999 we have excluded China from the analysis. In an unreported
robustness check we nd that removing that control and including China among origin countries does not aect
Result 3.
15capital-rich countries.20 In an unreported robustness check we have interacted capital abundance
with OECD membership (a proxy for a common diversication cone in the absence of factor price
data). We nd a non-signicant coecient for the interaction term, suggesting that Prediction 3
does not hold even in the favorable setting of OECD countries. This does certainly not discard
the extended Antr as (2003) model, but suggests that the prediction deserves further investigation.
Result 3 is also dicult to reconcile with intangible asset theories such as Ethier (1986) or
Ethier and Markusen (1996), which emphasize factor endowment dierences between countries. In
these theories endowment similarities make MNCs more protable than licensing arrangements or
than production in the non-manufacturing sector. France is among the top 10% capital-intensive
and top 25% skill-intensive countries in our sample. One would therefore expect more intrarm
imports from capital- and skill-rich countries, or possibly a non-signicant coecient. Intangible
asset theories may be consistent with our nding on skill abundance, whose coecient is positive
whenever signicant, but not with the regularity found for capital abundance.
Finally, Result 3 contradicts evidence on US imports (Antr as 2003, Bernard et al. 2010).
However as these empirical studies apply to the industry or product level ndings are not directly
comparable. In Section 5 we bridge the gap between our and the above-mentioned results by
considering both the extensive and intensive margins of import sourcing.
Our second result relates to contract enforcement.
Result 4: Intrarm trade is more likely with countries having good judicial institutions.
Result 4 states that the better a country's judicial system (high Qc), the less likely rms are
to engage in arms' length relationships. The result is robust to controlling for imported and nal
good contractibility. As an additional check (results available upon request) we break rms into
quartiles of TFP, and nd a higher coecient of Qc for more productive rms.
These results are consistent with Prediction 4. In Antr as and Helpman (2008) improved
product contractibility in the origin country has two opposite eects. First, more domestic rms
turn to arms' length imports (the Standard Eect). Second, the most productive importers switch
to intrarm trade, due to a weaker need to provide the supplier with high-powered incentives (the
Surprise Eect). Our results suggest that the Surprise Eect dominates the Standard Eect. We
therefore conrm the ndings by Nunn and Tre
er (2008) on product-level US data at the rm
level.21
20This is explained in footnote 22 in the working paper version of Antr as (2003).
21Our contract enforcement measure Qc diers from that of Nunn and Tre
er (2008), who interact Qc with
the Nunn (2007) product contractibility measure. We consider our measure more appropriate to test predictions
of the theory. Antr as and Helpman (2008) consider improvements of input contractibility in the South keeping
16Interestingly, Result 4 challenges the transaction-cost approach of, among others, McLaren
(2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002). In these models stronger legal protection should
reduce costs of agents' interactions outside the rm, and favor arms' length relationships instead.
Moving to product characteristics, we report a consistent pattern across dierent estimations
on the role of intermediate and nal product contractibility:
Result 5: The production of complex intermediate and nal goods (low p and f) is more likely to
occur within rm boundaries.
This result does not correspond to a theoretical prediction of the property rights approach.
In Antr as and Helpman (2008) comparative statics rely on contractibility by input-country pair.
It is generally unclear how a joint improvement in the contractibility of inputs both in the North
and the South aects the make-or-buy decision in the South.
However, result 5 can directly be related to the transaction-cost approach. Products that are
neither sold on an organized exchanged nor reference-priced, according to Rauch (1999), are likely
to have three important attributes. First, as suggested by Nunn (2007), these products involve
more relationship-specic investments, which creates appropriable quasi-rents. Transaction-cost
theory, starting from Williamson (1971), predicts that ownership prevents costly haggling over
appropriable quasi-rents. Second, these products are more complex, which increases the risk of
costly ex post renegotiation (see for instance Costinot et al. 2010). Third, these products typically
embody costly R&D eorts, which are better protected against imitation within rm boundaries,
as emphasized by the intangible asset theories.
Finally, neither product embodied capital (kp) nor skill intensity (hp) have a clear eect.
Coecients take either sign and/or are not signicant in some cases.
5 The Extensive and Intensive Margins of International Sourcing
Some of our ndings, and in particular Result 3, are at odds with the evidence provided by studies
using US industry- or product-level data. Why are our ndings dierent? We start by replicating
the same industry- and product-level estimations carried in those studies to rule out dierences
in the patterns of French and US intrarm trade and/or data collection.22 After successfully
contractibility in the North constant, while they only model one input. Therefore the comparative statics can only
be applied to countries, not inputs. In our linear model - the simplest possible function f(p;Qc) representing
contractibility of input p from country c - the coecient of Qc captures the model's comparative statics. This
argument notwithstanding, we also introduced an additional interaction term p Qc in unreported regressions and
found that it is not signicant.
22For instance, the denition of aliate trade diers in the two countries. Our French data record imports
from aliates where the parent holds more than 50% of the stock. In the US the equivalent thresholds are 6% in
17conrming US aggregate-level ndings with French data, we go one step further in our analysis
and show that there are interesting patterns operating, sometimes in opposite directions, at the
extensive (choice of sourcing mode) and intensive margins (value of imports in a given mode) of
international sourcing. The responsiveness of the rm-level intensive margin to factor abundance,
product contractibility, etc. is not predicted by theory. In Antr as (2003), for instance, that margin
is governed by some simplifying assumptions that are justied by the general equilibrium focus.
Future theoretical work can take further advantage of the fresh evidence provided by our rm-level
data on such margin.
5.1 France is Not Dierent From the US
We start by replicating US ndings with our French data. Table V reproduces some of the cross-
industry (column 1) and cross-country (column 2) regressions of Antr as (2003) for France. The
dependent variables Shares and Sharec represent the share of intrarm imports value at the
industry and country level, respectively. Industry-level covariates are NACE rev1 3-digit sector
averages of capital and skill intensity (ks and hs) and the nal good contractibility measure f.23
Country covariates are capital and skill abundance (kc and hc) as well as the log of country c
population in 1999 (Populationc) taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
Our estimations conrms ndings on US data by Antr as (2003) and other authors. In par-
ticular, the intrarm share increases with industry capital-intensity as well as with the capital
abundance of the origin country. Interestingly, the second nding contrasts, at rst sight, with
Result 3 in the rm-level analysis of the previous Section.
We also replicate product-country-level estimations on US data by Bernard et al. (2010).
These authors estimate a model of intrarm shares at the country-product level (Sharepc). Since
at this level of disaggregation Sharepc has many zeros, they use a Heckman two-stage procedure
to control for selection bias. In particular, their model has a rst-step probit model on the variable
^ Sharepc = 1 if Sharepc > 0 and zero otherwise, and a second-step equation similar to our Equation
(4) but (obviously) without rm controls.
Table VI reports estimation results with IM2 being the inverse Mills ratio coming from the
rst step. Our excluded variables are Colonyc, Same leg origc and Populationc. Our ndings
echo those of Bernard et al. (2010). In particular, we nd again a positive coecient of kc at
the product-country level. In addition, we nd that the quality of institutions (Qc) has a positive
Customs data and 10% in the Bureau of Economic Analysis survey of multinationals. Besides, as already discussed,
the EIIG only covers about 80% of French multinationals' imports due to non-response, while US Customs data are
in principle exhaustive.
23There is a direct correspondence between CPA products f and NACE rev1 3-digit industries s. Data on
advertising and R&D intensity, used in Antr as (2003), are not available to us.
18eect in the rst-stage equation, and a negative eect (though not signicant in our analysis) in
the second-stage equation.
5.2 Determinants of the Type and Value of Firms' International Sourcing
We now investigate both the rm binary choice between intrarm and arms' length imports
(extensive margin) and the value of rm imports in a given sourcing mode (intensive margin).
We proceed by estimating a two-stage Heckman model. The rst-stage equation is based on
specication four of Equation (4) using the small sample and rm controls. To obtain an exclusion
restriction, we add the rm's multinational status in 1994 as an additional regressor in the rst
stage.24 We then run two separate second-stage regressions, one for intrarm (log) import values
and one for outsourcing (log) import values with IM3 being the inverse Mills ratio coming from
the rst stage. To save space, only estimates on our key rm, country, and product covariates are
reported in Table VII.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table VII provide covariates estimates for the two intensive margins. Firm
total factor productivity and capital intensity are associated to larger import values under both
modes. On the other hand, rm skill intensity does not have a signicant impact on either case.
The TFPi nding is rather intuitive basically requiring more productive rms to operate at a larger
scale. However, estimates and standard errors indicate that the positive relationship between rm
productivity and import values is stronger in the case of outsourcing. On capital intensity (ki)
the dierence between coecients' values points to a stronger eect for arms' length sourcing.
That result complements existing evidence on importing rms, which is relatively scarce. For
instance Tomiura (2007) nds that Japanese rms outsourcing abroad are less capital-intensive
than Japanese multinationals. Bernard et al. (2007) nd that US importers are more capital-
intensive than US domestic rms.
Turning to country-level covariates, kc displays a negative and signicant coecient at the
outsourcing intensive margin, while the coecient at the intrarm intensive margin is not signif-
icant. The same applies to country skill abundance hc. With respect to kc, our decomposition
of international sourcing into the extensive and intensive margins thus reveals a complex picture.
Firms are more likely to import from capital-abundant countries at arms' length (Result 3) but,
24This information comes from the LIFI (`Liaisons Financi eres') database collected by the French Statistical Oce
(INSEE), which describes ownership ties between rms that have a legal entity in France. These data exhibit strong
persistence of multinational status, which suggests the presence of substantial sunk costs of creating a foreign
aliate. For this reason we argue that, conditional on other rm variables, past multinational status conveys
information on a rm's incentives to engage in intrarm imports without directly aecting their value. The logic
echoes analyses of the persistence of export status in Roberts and Tybout (1997) or Bernard and Jensen (2004). In
our dataset the correlation between multinational status in 1994 and 1999 is 0.38. The correlation between between
multinational status in 1994 and yipc is 0.25.
19in relative terms, average values of intrarm imports increase with capital abundance. Given
the positive coecient of kc in Tables V and VI, we conclude that the intensive margin eect
dominates.
How can we interpret this result? Existing theories do not explain why the value of intrarm
and outsourcing imports at the rm-level varies across countries. An extension where the as-
sumption of identical factor intensities in xed and variable costs is relaxed does not seem much
promising. Fixed costs would need to be less capital intensive under integration than under out-
sourcing to explain the negative coecient, which seems rather implausible. We can, however, risk
a conjecture. Relax the assumption of perfect transferability between the two parties, and suppose
that independent suppliers must pay capital costs upon entry. Entry of independent suppliers is
easier in capital-rich countries where the costs of capital are lower. These countries are therefore
more likely to benet from `thick-market externalities', for example through the alleviation of
ex-post hold-up problems, as in McLaren (2000), or search frictions, as in Grossman and Helpman
(2005). That makes outsourcing relatively more protable in capital abundant countries. That
conjecture would also imply lower variable costs and greater imports under outsourcing in capital-
rich countries. Regrettably, we do not have data on the number of available suppliers to test this
conjecture.
We also nd that the coecient of Qc is positive at the extensive margin but negative at the
intensive margin for both modes, with a greater magnitude for intrarm imports. This echoes
results on product-country intrarm shares in Bernard et al. (2010) which we replicate in Table VI.
One plausible explanation is that judicial systems matter more for the xed costs of integration
while they matter more for the variable costs of outsourcing. More theoretical research on this
topic would certainly be desirable.
Concerning product features, the contractibility of the imported product p has a negative
but not signicant eect on the intensive margin of intrarm trade, while displaying a positive
and signicant eect on outsourcing import values. Together with the negative extensive margin
coecient, our ndings are consistent with the intrarm share analysis of Bernard et al. (2010)
and our replication of their results, although our contractibility measure is less disaggregated
than theirs. Finally, while both nal product contractibility and embodied capital intensity do
not display a dierential impact on the intensive margin of the two modes, embodied skill intensity
does with intrarm imports growing with hp. Again, more theoretical work is needed in order to
rationalize these ndings.
206 Conclusion
We have conducted a detailed examination of rm-, country- and product-level determinants of
intrarm trade on a sample of 234,786 French rm-country-product import triples in 1999.
Our analysis is motivated by the property-rights models of the multinational rm of Antr as
(2003), Antr as and Helpman (2004), and Antr as and Helpman (2008). Three of our four key
empirical results accord with these theories, thereby conrming prior industry- and product-
level US evidence. Holding origin country and product attributes constant, we nd that more
productive, capital- and skill-intensive rms are more likely to engage in intrarm imports (Results
1 and 2). Controlling for observed and unobserved rm heterogeneity, we nd that intrarm
imports are more likely to originate from countries with good judicial institutions. The eect
is strongest for highly productive rms (Result 4). This contrasts with transaction-cost models
where improved contract enforcement makes outsourcing more likely. Overall, our results broadly
support the property-rights approach to the multinational rm. They further indicate that some
of the underlying industry-level assumptions of the theory can be protably extended to the rm-
level, from which most of the variation in key covariates { such as capital- and skill-intensity {
comes from.
We also uncover some empirical patterns of intrarm trade that have escaped previous industry-
and product-level analyses. In order to bridge previous aggregate ndings with our investigation we
decompose intrarm and arms' length imports into an extensive and intensive margin. For exam-
ple, we nd a hitherto unexplained role for the intensive margin of imports to explain cross-country
patterns in intrarm trade. Although country and product-country intrarm shares increase with
capital abundance, rms are less likely to engage in intrarm imports from capital-abundant coun-
tries (Result 3). That second result is very robust and holds even when controlling for observable
and unobservable rm characteristics. A two-stage regression analysis further shows that capital
abundance has a positive impact on the value of intrarm imports relative to outsourcing imports.
Therefore the results on industry- and product-level intrarm shares are actually driven by the
intensive margin. These results cannot be easily reconciled with the Antr as (2003) model, due
to some simplifying assumptions that are justied by the general equilibrium focus. Replication
of our result on disaggregated US data and further theoretical research to explain these patterns
would certainly be welcome.
Finally, we nd some robust empirical evidence that complex goods and inputs are more likely
to be produced within rm boundaries. This is consistent with the recent property-rights model
by Carluccio and Fally (2009), where the desirability of transferring ownership to suppliers of
21complex products is limited by the latter's nancial constraints. Our nding, however, is also
consistent with the transaction-cost approach via a dissipation of intangible assets argument.
Complex inputs embody costly R&D eorts or the use of other intangible assets, which are likely
to be more eectively protected against imitation within rm boundaries. Further research on
how to disentangle these competing explanations would be welcome.
Appendix
The EIIG database
Intrarm trade is dened in the primary EIIG data as trade with an aliate controlled by a single
French entity with at least fty percent of its equity capital. The SESSI denes two types of trade
with independent suppliers: 1) formal contractual relationships that refer to alliances, franchising,
joint-ventures, and licensing agreements; 2) `informal' relationships that involve less stringent
contractual links. We consider both types of trade with independent suppliers as outsourcing.
In the primary EIIG data 20,952 out of the 81,217 import 
ows are `pure' intrarm (in the
sense that 100% of imports of product p from country c come from a foreign aliate), 50,021 are
`pure' outsourcing, and 10,244 are `mixed triples'. Out of the 10,244 mixed triples, 5,391 have
80% or more of the import value under a single sourcing mode (intrarm or outsourcing). We
choose to record these mixed triples according to the prevalent sourcing mode. Therefore, we end
up with 76,364 triples from the EIIG database. As will be explained below, our nal sample has
281,419 observations. Mixed triples represent 3.64% of the nal sample, while the 4,853 mixed
triples excluded from the analysis represent only 1.72% of all observations in the nal sample.
Further details on the EIIG database can be found in Guannel and Plateau (2003).
Construction of the estimation sample
In order to construct our estimation sample, we start by rening the population of interest. The
EIIG survey was addressed to large traders, i.e. rms trading more than 1 million euros. There
are 30,028 such rms in 1999 French Customs data, accounting for the bulk of imports (95.46%)
in 1999. Out of these 30,028 large traders, 8,236 belong to the EIIG target population. We match
the Customs and EIIG datasets under the assumption that import 
ows recorded in Customs
data by rms other than the EIIG target population, occur with a third party. Put dierently, we
assume that SESSI successfully identied multinational rms among large traders.
Had all the 8,236 rms who received the EIIG questionnaire replied to the survey, a simple
match of the EIIG data with imports by the remaining 21,792 non-multinational rms would
provide us with full information on the population of large traders. However, about half of them
(3,931) did not reply to the survey with these rms accounting for less than 20% of total exports
and imports of the EIIG target population. Non-response to the EIIG survey thus seems to be
non-random with responding rms likely to be larger and possibly more productive than non-
respondents.
To address potential biases, we construct a representative sample of the population of both
multinational and non-multinational large importing French rms. To deal with sample selection
due to non-response in the EIIG survey we use a two-stage Heckman procedure. In the rst
stage we estimate the probability that one of the importing rms in the EIIG target population
22responds to the survey, using rm total imports value, number of product categories imported,
number origin countries involved, and NACE rev1 3-digit industry dummies. These variables
re
ect our presumption that a higher data collection eort was allocated by SESSI to large im-
porters and/or certain sectors. This generates an inverse Mills ratio (IM1) at the rm-level for all
rms responding to the EIIG survey. We subsequently use IM1, but none of the above rst-stage
variables, as an additional regressor throughout our rm-country-product analysis.
Finally, we construct a random sample of the population of non-multinational French large
importers, i.e. importers that trade 1 million euros or more but do not belong to the EIIG target
population. We do so by drawing a fraction of non-multinational importers that matches the
response rate of the EIIG survey. By merging such a random sample with the EIIG data on
respondent rms we get our nal sample. In our analysis we will refer to this nal sample as
the `large sample'. It includes 281,419 observations spanning over 14,711 rms, 219 countries
and 272 CPA96 4-digit products. Matching that sample with the EAE survey that documents
manufacturing rm characteristics generates a 'small' sample of 98,168 observations spanning over
5,175 rms, 185 countries and 270 products.
Firm Variables
Productivity. We estimate TFP as the residual (plus the constant) of a log-linearized three-
factor Cobb-Douglas production function with labor, capital and material inputs. We use the
value-added based Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator (LP).
We estimate TFP based on the unbalanced EAE panel of 28,587 rms over 3 years (1998 to
2000) for a total of 74,120 observations. Observations with negative or missing values of value
added, production, capital stock, material inputs and wages are eliminated. Outliers, identied
as observations falling outside the 1st and 99th percentile of the distributions of value added per
worker and capital stock per worker, are also not considered. This leaves us with TFP information
on 22,673 rms for the core year 1999. TFP estimation has been carried out separately for each
of the NACE 3-digit industries in the manufacturing sector.
Factor intensities. Our measure of capital intensity ki is the log of the ratio between the
capital stock and employment of rm i. hi is the log of the ratio between total wage expenses
and employment of rm i. This variable is meant to capture the average skills of workers of rm
i with the underlying hypothesis being that more skilled workers are paid higher salaries.
Imported Product Variables
Contractibility. Our contractibility measure is based on the same idea as Nunn (2007): inputs
sold on an organized exchange or reference priced are likely to be less relationship-specic, and
therefore that sales contracts of these inputs are less incomplete. We also use the Rauch (1999)
`Liberal' product classication.
However we apply the relationship-specicity index to imported products directly. In Section
2 we contended that a proper test of Antr as and Helpman (2008) predictions would need to distin-
guish between contractibility of the inputs provided by the foreign supplier and those provided by
the nal producer. A second advantage of having product-level measures is that a nal producer
typically imports several products, with potentially dierent organizational decisions.
Our approach contrasts with Nunn (2007) and Nunn and Tre
er (2008) who compute a
weighted average of that index by nal industry, using input-output matrix coecients as weights.
23In their approach an emphasis on institutional comparative advantage makes it logical to measure
how much exporting industries rely on complex inputs. Our approach focuses on organizational
decisions by importers, so that a measure at the imported product level is more appropriate.
Denoting by Rneither
j a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the HS6 product j is neither sold
on an organized exchange nor reference priced, and by p;j the share of the HS6 product j in the
French imports of CPA96 4digit product p in 1999 we have:





The basic data needed to construct contractibility measures comes from Rauch (1999) and
are organized on the basis of the SITC rev2 4 digit. Our import data are at the CPA96 4digit
classication. To aggregate the Rauch data at the imported goods level, we proceed in two steps.
First we establish (using data from the RAMON project) a correspondence between HS6 and
SITC rev2 4 digit and a correspondence between HS6 and CPA96 4digit. Then we use import
trade data in 1999 for France at the HS6 level (provided by EUROSTAT) as weights to aggregate
the original SITC rev2 4 digit information to the CPA96 4digit.
Embodied capital and skill intensity. Embodied capital kp and skill intensity hp of the
imported product p are constructed using French technology. We introduce these variables because
in Antr as (2003) factor intensities of the imported product play a key role. In the absence of cross-
country product-level data on technology these variables should be seen as reasonable proxies.
To build kp and hp, we start by using a correspondence table between the industry classication
NACE rev1 4digit (available in our EAE rm dataset) and the product classication CPA96 4digit.
We then compute the average capital intensity (log of capital/labor ratio) and skill intensity (log
of total wage expenses/number of full time equivalent workers) of French rms associated to a
given CPA96 4digit product.
Final Product Variables
Contractibility. Contractibility of a nal good f is measured in the same way as that of an
imported product. Dening Rneither
j as dummy variable that takes value 1 if the PRODCOM2002
8 digit product j is neither sold on an organized exchange nor reference priced, and by f;j the
share of the PRODCOM2002 8 digit product j in the French production of CPA96 4digit product
f in 1999 we have:






Key covariates. kc and hc stand (respectively) for the capital and skill abundance of country
c. They are respectively measured by the log of the capital/labor and human capital/labor ratios
provided by Hall and Jones (1999). Qc is a measure of the quality of institutions based on the
\Rule of Law" index from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). This is a weighted average of
a number of variables that measure individuals' perceptions of the eectiveness and predictability
of the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts in each country between 1997 and 1998.
24Controls. Taxc is the top corporate tax rate prevailing in a given country in 1999 taken from
the World Tax Database (University of Michigan). Fin Devc is a proxy for the degree of devel-
opment of nancial markets which we borrow from Beck (2002). OECDc is a dummy indicating
membership to the OECD in 1999. Same   leg   origc is a dummy indicating whether country c
has a French civil law system (Djankov et al., 2003). Distwc is the log of distance of country c to
France. Colonyc is dummy indicating whether country c is a former French colony and Languagec
is a dummy indicating whether French is spoken in country c. Data on Distwc, Colonyc, and
Languagec) come from CEPII (Centre d'Etude Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales).
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Table I: Raw correlations between our main dependent variable (intrarm trade dummy yi;p;c)
and key regressors
Firm-Level Variables
Productivity (TFPi) Capital Intensity (ki) Skill Intensity (hi)
0.1230 0.1070 0.1680
Country-Level Variables
Capital Abundance (kc) Skill Abundance (hc) Contract Enforcement (Qc)
-0.0094 0.0525 0.0389
Product-Level Variables
Imported Product Final Product Embodied Capital Embodied Skill
Contractibility (p) Contractibility (f) Intensity (kp) Intensity (hp)
-0.0548 -0.0763 0.0068 0.0793
Correlations with rm variables refer to the small sample while in all other cases but f correlations are
computed in the large sample. In the case of f, correlation is computed on the subset of the large
sample referring to rms with main activity in (essentially) manufacturing.
28Table II: Summary statistics on rm-level variables
% Intra-NACE3 Correlation with
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Min Max TFPi ki hi
Full EAE Firm Data
TFPi 22,673 3.8076 1.4065 0.3116 -79.0078 11.7314 1.0000
ki 22,673 3.3040 1.0257 0.8261 -8.2213 8.3878 0.0452 1.0000
hi 22,673 3.0357 0.3093 0.8804 -6.6951 6.2796 0.1808 0.2114 1.0000
EAE Firm Sample Used in Estimations
TFPi 5,134 3.9955 1.9309 0.2363 -55.8379 11.1462 1.0000
ki 5,134 3.7547 0.9764 0.8051 -6.7092 7.4743 0.0357 1.0000
hi 5,134 3.1075 0.3484 0.8858 -6.6951 5.3584 0.1474 0.1751 1.0000
Summary statistics on rm productivity TFPi, capital intensity ki, and skill intensity hi refer to either the full
EAE rm data (top panel) or to the sub-sample of EAE rms used in estimations (bottom panel). %
Intra-NACE3 Std. Ded. refers, for each variable considered, to the ratio between the standard deviation within
NACE 3-digit industries and the overall standard deviation.
Table III: Firm-specic determinants of intrarm trade.
















Product Dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 95,493 95,493 95,493 95,493
Pseudo R
2 0.1467 0.1405 0.1502 0.1565
Log Likelihood -32,767 -33,005 -32,634 -32,391
The dependent variable yi;p;c equals 1 if imports by rm i of product p from country c are intrarm and zero
otherwise. The key covariates are rm i total factor productivity TFPi, capital intensity ki, and skill intensity hi.
IM1 is the inverse Mills ratio, coming from the estimation of selection into response to the EIIG survey, which is
set to zero for rms outside the EIIG target population. A Probit model is estimated for all specications.
Marginal eects are presented. Firm-clustered standard errors in brackets.
a,
b,
c denote signicantly dierent
from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
29Table IV: Country and Product-specic determinants of intrarm trade.
Dep. var.: Intrarm dummy yi;p;c (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Key Covariates
Country-Level Covariates
Capital Abundance (kc) -0.0044c -0.0083a -0.1575a -0.0227a -0.0186a
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0290) (0.0080) (0.0055)
Skill Abundance (hc) 0.0336a 0.0317a 0.0665 -0.0104 0.0610a
(0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0932) (0.0190) (0.0190)
Contract Enforcement (Qc) 0.0981a 0.1020a 0.6891a 0.1611c 0.1454a
(0.0159) (0.0165) (0.1661) (0.0849) (0.0379)
Product-Level Covariates
Imported Product Contractibility (p) -0.0379a -0.2290a -0.0369b -0.0447a
(0.0040) (0.0284) (0.0178) (0.0068)
Final Product Contractibility (f) -0.2730a -0.0779a
(0.0907) (0.0147)
Embodied Capital Intensity (kp) 0.0085a -0.0600a -0.0183b 0.0022
(0.0024) (0.0186) (0.0088) (0.0051)
Embodied Skill Intensity (hp) 0.0750a 0.1061c 0.0231 0.0597a
(0.0067) (0.0555) (0.0171) (0.0178)
Controls
IM1 and IM1 and IM1 and Country IM1, Country
Country Country Country Controls and Controls and
Controls Controls Controls Firm FE Firm Controls
Estimation Method
Probit Probit Random Conditional Probit
Eects Firm Fixed
Probit Eects Logit
Number of Observations 251,022 234,786 101,771 35,802 82,923
Pseudo R2 0.1949 0.2002 { { 0.1110
Log Likelihood -61,224 -58,470 -18,749 -13,948 -30,549
The dependent variable yi;p;c equals 1 if imports by rm i of product p from country c are intrarm and zero otherwise. The
key covariates are country c capital intensity kc, skill intensity hc, and quality of judicial institutions Qc, as well as imported
product p contractibility p, embodied capital intensity kp, and embodied skill intensity hp. In some specications, the
contractibility of the importing rm main nal product f is also considered. Our measures of contractibility are available
only for merchandized goods. Therefore, estimating f requires us to focus on rms with primary activity in (essentially)
manufacturing reducing, as can be seen by comparing columns (1) and (2) with (3), considerably the number of
observations. With the conditional rm xed eects Logit { column (4) { the identifying variation is provided by those
observations (35,802) referring to rms engaging in, depending on the country and/or product, both intrarm and
outsourcing. In this case f, which is rm-specic, cannot be estimated. Finally, column (5) corresponds to observations for
which rm-level controls are available from the EAE database. IM1 is the inverse Mills ratio, coming from the estimation of
selection into response to the EIIG survey, which is set to zero for rms outside the EIIG target population. Marginal eects
are presented in all cases. In the xed eects Logit case, marginal eects are obtained by setting xed eects to zero.
Firm-clustered standard errors (except for the random eects Probit and xed eects Logit) in brackets. a, b, c denote
signicantly dierent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
30Table V: Reproducing previous aggregate ndings: the share of intrarm trade in imports' value
at the industry and country levels.
(1) (2)
Dependent variable Shares Sharec
Industry-Level Covariates
Industry Capital Intensity (ks) 0.0543
c
(0.0304)
Industry Skill Intensity (hs) 0.2361
a
(0.0905)




Capital Abundance (kc) 0.0426
b
(0.0191)
Skill Abundance (hc) 0.0855
(0.1014)
Log Population (Populationc) 0.0178
(0.0111)
Number of Observations 215 112
R
2 0.0976 0.1938
The dependent variables Shares and Sharec represent the ratio of intrarm imports value over total imports
value in industry (NACE rev1 3-digit) s and country c, respectively. Estimation is carried via OLS. Robust
standard errors in brackets.
a,
b,
c denote signicantly dierent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
31Table VI: Reproducing previous aggregate ndings: the share of intrarm trade in imports' value
at the imported product-country level with an Heckman selection model.
Heckman Heckman
First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: ^ Sharepc Sharepc
Product-Level Covariates
Embodied Capital Intensity (kp) -0.0166 0.0580
a
(0.0290) (0.0106)













Skill Abundance (hc) 0.3758
a 0.0059
(0.1175) (0.0402)
Contract Enforcement (Qc) 1.9991
a -0.1060
(0.1705) (0.0674)








Ex Colony Dummy (Colonyc) -0.0637 Excluded
(0.0632) {
Common Legal Origin Dummy (Same   leg   origc) 0.3321
a Excluded
(0.0447) {




Inverse Mills Ratio (IM2) { 0.2687
a
{ (0.0253)
Number of Observations 7,500 3,202
R
2 0.2135 0.0944
Log Likelihood -4,026 {
The dependent variable ^ Sharepc in the rst stage of the Heckman procedure - column (1) - equals 1 if the share of
intrarm trade of product p with country c is positive and zero otherwise. The excluded variables in the second
stage are ex French colony, same (French) legal origin, and log population. The dependent variable Sharepc in the
second stage of the Heckman procedure - column (2) - corresponds to the positive values of the share of intrarm
trade of product p with country c with covariates including the inverse Mills ratio coming from the rst stage
(IM2). Robust standard errors in brackets.
a,
b,
c denote signicantly dierent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Marginal eects and pseudo R
2 are reported for the rst stage.
32Table VII: The Extensive and Intensive margin of rms' international sourcing: Heckman selection
model
Heckman Heckman
First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Intrarm Intrarm Outsourcing



































Final Product Contractibility (f) -0.0644
a 0.0484 0.0370
(0.0137) (0.1066) (0.0796)









IM1, Past MNE IM1, IM3, IM1, IM3,
Status, Country Country and Country and
and Firm Controls Firm Controls Firm Controls
Number of Observations 82,923 11,973 70,739
R
2 0.1338 0.1150 0.1596
Log Likelihood -29,765 { {
The rst stage of the Heckman procedure - column (1) - is a probit where the variable yipc equals 1 if imports by
rm i of product p from country c are intrarm and zero otherwise. Estimations are carried out on the small
sample for which rm-level data are available from the EAE database. The excluded variable in the second stage
is rm Multinational status in 1994. The second stage of the Heckman procedure - columns (2) and (3) - is an
OLS regression on the values of (log) imports for a given mode (either intrarm or outsourcing) and contains the
inverse Mills ratio coming from the rst stage (IM3) as well as the inverse Mills ratio coming from the selection
into response for EIIG rms (IM1). The latter is set to zero for rms outside the EIIG target population.
Firm-clustered standard errors in brackets.
a,
b,
c denote signicantly dierent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Marginal eects and pseudo R
2 are reported for the rst stage.
33Figure I: Kernel smoothed distribution of log imports' value by rm-country-product
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